Apostasy & Islamic Civil Society in Malaysia by Lemière, S.
4 6  I S I M  R E V I E W  2 0  /  A U T U M N  2 0 0 7
While Malaysian society is praised as a 
harmonious and peaceful patchwork of 
identities, religious issues are causing 
social strains. Some sections of the Ma-
lay-Muslim community have begun to 
challenge the official stance on aposta-
sy. The Badawi government’s awkward 
silence reveals its unwillingness to take 
a position on this issue, as any step for-
ward would certainly cost it the loss of 
its Malay constituency. There is now a 
real struggle within civil society between those advocating complete 
freedom of religion and those condemning apostasy. The two main 
contenders in this debate are those defending the constitutional free-
dom of belief, brought together in the coalition named “Article 11,” and 
the neo-conservative parties represented by the “Allied Coordinating 
Islamic NGOs” (ACCIN). This article looks at the debate on apostasy in 
Malaysia, focusing primarily on the neo-conservative Islamic move-
ments that wish to turn Malaysia into a modern Islamic state. 
From semantic to legal ambiguity
Malaysian society has a long history of religious and cultural pluralism. 
All Malaysians, be they of Chinese, Indian, or Malay background, are uni-
fied under the banner of their common universal Malaysian citizenship. 
While some non-Muslims find themselves dubbed kuffar (non-believers) 
and, therefore, treated as second-class citizens, apostates who leave Islam 
are perceived as traitors to the faith. Because Islam is inscribed in the con-
stitution as the official religion of the federation,1 religion has become 
overtly politicized. 
The emergence of a third category of citizen, the Malay non-Muslim, 
blurs the margins of a previously clear religious distinction. Malaysian 
apostates are a minority of Muslims who have renounced Islam. In the 
Malaysian context this decision has far-reaching consequences: it has 
taken them on a journey through a legal and social imbroglio.
According to the National Constitution of 1956, a “Malay is a person 
who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, 
[and] conforms to Malay customs.”2 This legal definition means that the 
term “Muslim” cannot be disassociated from the category “Malay.”3 Ac-
cordingly, ethnicity is the determinant of religious confession: a Malay 
has to be Muslim and popular conventions consider any Muslim as Malay. 
Therefore, the different usages and meanings of the term Malay create a 
major ambivalence: being a Malay could entail that someone is (1) a son/
daughter of the soil or a Bumiputera, (2) a Muslim, or (3) both. This ho-
mogenized definition of “Malay,” one that blends religion, tradition, and 
culture, is central to a heated debate. 
The term Malay leads us into numerous ambiguities. The primary mean-
ing of the word “Malay” describes the son/daughter of soil known as bu-
miputera. Nevertheless, the term “Malay” hijacked by the constitution and 
popular conventions is now widely synonymous to Muslim. Thus, the so-
called “Malay category” includes Chinese, Indian, and, of course, Malay 
bumiputeras who also happen to be Muslim. In this category where Islam 
is the matrix, one may easily ask whether there exists any expression of 
ethnic differences. 
The term Malay has been detached from its original meaning and is in-
appropriate to describe the Muslim community as a whole. For example, 
the Chinese Muslim association of Malaysia encounters problems when 
it comes to conversion. By converting to Islam, commonly defined as 
“masuk malayu” (literally “entering the Malay community”), they will in 
fact become “Malay.” The new converts to Islam fear a loss of their Chinese 
cultural background. The Malaysian Chinese Muslim association, MACMA, 
has tried to counter the apprehension of new converts by stressing that 
being Muslim does not, of itself, entail being Malay.
Nevertheless, this semantic route is 
not a major problem within the com-
munity itself. Ethnic differences do 
not readily lead to tensions within the 
Muslim community. Islam represents a 
link between people of different ethnic 
origins and tends to be a prime qual-
ity minimizing cultural differences. The 
tensions emerge when it comes to po-
litical issues and, of course, apostasy.
The challenge of deserting Islam in Malaysia
The religious distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims has been 
institutionalized by the federal government: the word “Islam” appears on 
the national identification card of each Malaysian citizen professing Islam 
as his/her religion. Effectively, this ties the individual to the version of Is-
lamic law active in their place of residence. Every Malaysian professing 
Islam is officially registered as “Muslim” and placed under the authority 
of the religious department and the Sharia court. This means that his/
her life, from birth to burial, will be guided according to both Islamic and 
federal law. Consequently, Muslims who have renounced Islam find them-
selves occupying an abyssal legal zone. 
Due to the federal system of governance in Malaysia, each state is al-
lowed to introduce and implement Islamic laws of its own: in the year 
2000, the state of Perlis, under the rule of the ruling UMNO party, intro-
duced its own faith protection bill proposing apostates be sent to faith 
rehabilitation centres. According to Article 4, the federal law edited in the 
constitution is supreme. Nevertheless, the conservatives claim that no law 
can supersede Islamic law, which they consider divinely sealed. Referring 
to Article 160 of the federal constitution, the renunciation of Islam by an 
ethnic Malay jeopardises the integrity of the legal category to which this 
individual belongs. At the same time, Article 11 paradoxically guarantees 
that each Malaysian citizen must be left to enjoy freedom of belief. 
In all cases, conversion out of Islam is interpreted as a way of escaping 
the “Muslim administrative and legal category.” Today, dozens of Malay-
sian citizens have been denied the right to change their religion and to 
practice the religion of their choice as allowed by the federal constitu-
tion.4 For a more precise idea of the various ins and outs of apostasy in 
Malaysia, consider the case of Lina Joy.
Azlina Jailani, converted to Christianity in 1998, changed her name to 
Lina Joy and wanted to marry a Roman Catholic. The National Registra-
tion Department (NRD) accepted the change to her name, but did not 
remove the word “Islam” from her identification card. In 1999, Lina Joy 
filed a first complaint against the NRD and simultaneously asked for an 
official declaration from the federal territory religious department testi-
fying her renouncement of Islam. Lina Joy subsequently entered—and 
promptly lost herself within—an administrative jungle: the federal court 
refused to take any decision as long as her renouncement was not certi-
fied by the religious department. The verdict of the federal court in May 
2007 confirmed the fact that civil court has no jurisdiction in this matter. 
Therefore, the case has been left to the Sharia court even if the defendant 
claims not longer to be Muslim. 
In other words, Muslims cannot rely on Article 11 relating to freedom 
of worship, while Sharia law does not allow them to convert from Islam 
to another religion. Consequently, the supremacy of the constitution is 
challenged and this decision will impact on other cases waiting for de-
cisions from lower courts. Apostasy has now become a social and legal 
challenge. 
The power rise of a neo-conservative Islamic civil society 
In Malaysia, the concept of “civil society” emerged in the 1990s and 
was promoted by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, dur-
In Malaysia, legal definitions of the religious 
category “Muslim” and ethnic category “Malay” 
imply each other. Consequently, Muslims who 
have renounced Islam find themselves in an 
abyssal legal zone. The legal intricacies and the 
media representations surrounding apostasy 
reveal tensions between “the secular” and 
“the religious,” thereby providing insight into 
the imbalanced and bifurcated nature of civil 
society in Malaysia. 
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and to promote their respective positions. The rule of the game con-
sists in organizing attractive events bankable for the media: “media 
coup.” The “media coup” strategy then leads the organization to reach a 
large audience and overthrow the other party. 
“Article 11” started a road show entitled “Federal Constitution: pro-
tection for all” about freedom of religion in Malaysia. As the forum 
started to gain resonance among the public and increasingly received 
attention in the national media, ACCIN and its allies organized protests 
in front of the venues where the public talks were held. The forums in 
Penang and Johor had to be aborted by the police because of secu-
rity risks, due to the tensions growing among the protesters. The event 
made the front page of the main newspaper exaggerating the num-
bers of demonstrators from 200 to 400. 
Following the event, the government urged “Article 11” to end the 
discussion and stop its forums, seen as a threat to social peace. A few 
days later, ACCIN and its co-allies, the youth branch of the ruling party 
(UMNO) among them, organized a massive public meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur. The subject of the forum was: “Challenge to the Rights of Mus-
lims.” 
ACCIN coalition is using the media strategically 
by organizing spectacular demonstrations, such 
as that occurring on May 14 in Penang. Actually, 
the media scene represents a virtual room of de-
bate for both coalitions playing the game of prov-
ocation and answers through the Internet, news-
papers, newsletters, etc. and providing a tool of 
propaganda by which neo-conservativs aim to 
create a virtual common front. Without minimiz-
ing its importance, the debate on apostasy must 
be seen as a pretext (similarly to the debate in the 
film The Da Vinci Code, or during the crisis stirred 
up by cartoons of Muhammad) to affirm their ex-
istence and to announce a wake up call to the en-
tire Muslim community. The media are a channel 
to reach an international audience and the “Mus-
lim public sphere.”9 
The rise of power of “neoconservative” fronts 
supported by political allies signifies the imbal-
anced nature of civil society, which, in turn, un-
derlines the frail balance of Malaysian society. 
The recent denouement in apostasy cases has not 
pacified the debate; rather, it has intensified the 
division between Muslims and non-Muslims. The 
verdict of the Federal court in Lina Joy’s case re-
fusing the recognition of her conversion to Chris-
tianity and highlighting the fact that Sharia court 
is the only jurisdiction with any authority on this 
matter reveals the perversion of a dual legal sys-
tem. From both legal and social perspectives, this 
decision has limited the debate on apostasy to an 
exclusively Muslim sphere.
ing his programme of Islamization. Civil society, or Masyarakat Madani, 
was a way of “rethinking and refashioning modernity for Muslim so-
ciety” that would pave the way for Islamic principles in an imagined 
modern future.5 According to this way of thinking, civil society is in-
trinsically linked to religion and particularly to Islam; it is the reflection 
of the binary Malaysian society. Malaysian society and civil society are 
divided in two parts: Islamic and non-Islamic. In fact, the Malaysian civil 
society is intrinsically linked to religious issues. Among those represent-
ing human rights, women rights, consumer rights and so on, numerous 
Malaysian NGOs are religious and a majority of them are Muslim.6 
Malaysian Islamic NGOs play a key role in diffusing the Islamic mes-
sage in Malaysia and encouraging conversions to the official line: 
Sunni, Shafi‘ite thought. For example, some of the organizations within 
ACCIN coalition are offering Islamic teaching classes to Muslim families 
and, targeting non-Muslim Malaysians and foreigners, special courses 
to “discover Islam.” The first government of Malaysia has created its 
own conversion organization. Nowadays, this NGO is still funded by 
the state. Of course, this fails to fit with the Western definition of NGOs 
according to which political independence is vital. In fact, many NGOs 
(in particular Islamic ones) in Malaysia tend to be linked to political 
parties and/or the government. Conversely, on the grounds that (1) 
some of their members belong to political parties and (2) their official 
statements often reflect the programmes or interests of specific po-
litical parties their claim to be apolitical is mere rhetoric. For example, 
local political figures and members of the Islamic party (PAS) joined the 
demonstration held by members of ACCIN in Penang in May 14 2006. In 
this context, one in which members of an NGO may also be members 
of a political party and another NGO at the same time, measuring the 
significance of Islamic civil society with any degree of accuracy is hard 
to do. 
Only one Muslim organization, Sisters in Islam (SIS), joined the coa-
lition “Article 11” in favour of the freedom of religion. SIS represents 
a real exception because it is the only Islamic NGOs fighting with the 
liberal front. The main Islamic organizations which joined ACCIN (the 
neoconservative coalition) consider SIS' positions extremely liberal and 
even deny its Islamic attribution. 
ACCIN is an umbrella for no less than 14 NGOs. Their members are 
mostly from the urban middle class, students or professionals, but the 
branches spread throughout the country allow them to reach people 
from most, if not all, social backgrounds. Their activities range from Is-
lamic and general education, social help, to proselytizing. Generally, 
their funding comes from their members and they have their own web-
site and newsletter. 
ACCIN: support and actions 
ACCIN’s common enemy is the “Article 11” coalition and their parti-
sans. ACCIN’s ambition is clearly to put an end to the discussion initi-
ated by “Article 11” and counter their arguments in favour of freedom 
of renunciation of Islam. ACCIN has taken the view that “Article 11” is a 
threat to Islam and to the right of Muslims to live under Islamic princi-
ples and laws. 
The defensive strategy of ACCIN is defined by its committee mem-
bers, presided over by Yusri Mohammed, head of the country’s largest 
Islamic organization Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM).7 Two impor-
tant NGOs not directly related to ACCIN support its activities: Peguam 
Pembela Islam, commonly known as Pembela or PPI, and Badan anti-
IFC, or BADAI. Pembela was created in 2006 by a group of 100 lawyers 
willing to fight against the Malaysian Bar council members siding with 
“Article 11.” 
BADAI was created to undermine the project of an Inter Faith council 
(IFC) which aimed at creating a space where religious issues could be 
discussed openly. The IFC project was abandoned in 2005 because the 
main Islamic organization, led by Abim and Jemaah Islah Malaysia (JIM)8 
were opposed to having their own religious principles challenged. 
BADAI and its members initiated numerous actions set up in order to 
reach a large audience through massive media coverage. 
A media strategy
The Malaysian media scene broadcasts in all of the languages used 
in the country (Chinese, Malay, English, Tamil, Hindu). The media voice 
is controlled by severe rules embodied in the Freedom of Information 
Act. Nevertheless the coverage of the debate on apostasy is massive. 
Media provides a useful tool for civil society to reach a large audience 
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